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1. Introduction 
Throughout history, the idea of cosmopolitanism has been articulated in many different forms. 
The most famous modern version was formulated by Kant. He was concerned with which 
moral, legal and political conditions would be required to establish a condition of 
cosmopolitan justice (Brown & Held 2010, 8). He envisaged a League of Nations in which 
sovereign states commit themselves to universal human rights and preserving peace. Modern 
day philosophers like David Held emphasise that cosmopolitan institutions are necessary to 
address the global challenges of the future. Issues like climate change, the world food problem 
and global inequality urge humanity to cooperate rather than be divided. The cosmopolitan 
project has evoked critical responses from a number of fields. Chantal Mouffe criticises 
cosmopolitanism from a realist agonistic perspective. Her critique is particularly interesting 
because it targets the underlying assumptions of cosmopolitanism. Many critiques of 
cosmopolitanism are about feasibility or aimed at a specific version of cosmopolitan 
institutions, such as a world state or global democracy. Mouffe however provides a principled 
argument against the cosmopolitan project in its totality. She objects that cosmopolitanism 
postulates the availability of a world beyond hegemony and beyond sovereignty, thereby 
negating the dimension of the political (Mouffe 2013, 19).  
Mouffe brings forth two arguments why cosmopolitanism negates the political. First, 
cosmopolitans aim to fit all of humanity under a single framework of and norms and rules. 
This framework is legitimised by an appeal to universal moral values and presented as fully 
inclusive, neutral and acceptable for all humans. For Mouffe, this is unacceptable. Mouffe’s 
political ontology comprises value pluralism: the nature of values is such that they are plural 
and incommensurable. This implies that any order is always an hegemonic order. The problem 
of cosmopolitanism is not so much that is hegemonic, but rather that it presents itself as neutral 
and objective. The pretention of going beyond hegemony negates the possibility of legitimate 
contestation of that hegemony. Second, cosmopolitanism leaves no room for democratic self-
expression of sovereign peoples. For Mouffe, sovereignty is located in a people. Their 
collective right to self-government is threatened by the establishment of a cosmopolitan law 
(Mouffe 2005, 101). In short, cosmopolitanism eliminates the chances for legitimate expression 
of difference (Mouffe and Martin 2013, 20). As a consequence, those who do not agree with the 
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current order are forced to voice their criticism via other channels. According to Mouffe, this 
leads to a return to antagonistic forms of conflict which threaten the stability of the established 
order. For these reasons Mouffe opposes the idea of a global order based on cosmopolitan 
principles.  
The validity of these arguments can of course be questioned. Nonetheless, I think that Mouffe’s 
arguments offer an interesting perspective on thinking about a global order. For the sake of 
the argument, I will take Mouffe’s arguments and ontological commitments as a starting point. 
The question that arises is: what kind of global order would Mouffe have good reasons to 
accept, given her own ontological commitments? Such a global order would have to 
accommodate the political. This means that it must meet two criteria: 
A) It has to set standards for legitimate contestation of the dominant order. This is a 
response against the claim that a centralised global order aims to go beyond hegemony. 
B) It has to accommodate the democratic self-expression of sovereign peoples. This is a 
response against the claim that a centralised global order goes beyond sovereignty. 
It is my thesis that, in contrast with what Mouffe beliefs herself, a centralised global order can 
be legitimised on the basis of Mouffe’s realist agonistic principles. In order to defend this 
thesis, I will make the following argumentative steps. 
First, I set out the debate between cosmopolitans and Mouffe’s realist agonism. The focus of 
this discussion is on how the ontological commitments of both fields lead them to approach 
the question of a legitimate global order in different ways. Cosmopolitans are rooted in a broad 
tradition of liberal egalitarian philosophy. Their moral ontology leads them to belief that a 
rational consensus is a possibility and that some values can be universally endorsed. For 
cosmopolitans, political authority is legitimate if it reflects consent or universally valid moral 
values (Peter 2017). For Mouffe, the question of legitimacy is political. That means that any 
legitimate global order has to consider value pluralism, conflict and power. By the end of the 
chapter, we have a clear view of how Mouffe’s ontological commitments inform the criteria 
for a global order that is acceptable from a realist agonistic perspective.  
Second, I discuss Mouffe’s proposal for a global order based on a plurality of power centres. 
According to her, a stable and legitimate global order does not need a shared commitment to 
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a number of rules and norms. I argue that this claim is at odds with her own ideas about the 
transformation from antagonism into agonism. A stable global order does presuppose rules 
and norms that set out the terms of legitimate cooperation.  
Third, I set out to develop my own alternative to Mouffe’s proposal. Mouffe’s description of a 
multipolar world offers a starting point for thinking how a centralised global order can be 
established. For this argument, I discuss how Mouffe relates to the schools of realism in 
political philosophy and international relations. I argue that they share some relevant 
standpoints which makes the realist conceptual tools acceptable for Mouffe. I contend that a 
balance of power offers the correct background for the formation of a shared symbolic space. 
On the basis of a realist account of legitimacy, I argue that this shared symbolic space is a 
possible source for the legitimation of a global legal order. A centralised global order can thus 
be founded and legitimised on principles that are acceptable for Mouffe. Such a global order 
is able to fulfil the two criteria for accommodating the political. I support this claim in the 
subsequent two chapters. 
Fourth, I argue that a global order does not pretend to go beyond hegemony (addressing 
criterion A). I deal with two topics. To start, it is important to recognise that any global order 
will always be hegemonic. This means that although a global order is universal in its scope, it 
is always particular in its content. The point is not to eradicate hegemony as a principle, but to 
find ways that can challenge the absolutist nature that hegemonies can take. The hegemony of 
the US was difficult to challenge, since it was backup up by a unipolar distribution of real 
force. However, under a multipolar distribution of power no party can force its own 
interpretation of the global order onto others. The global order has to provide means that allow 
for contestation. Subsequently, I argue that a centralised global order does not necessarily 
presuppose a common identity such as the cosmopolitans suggest. According to Mouffe, 
political communities are inherently built on an us/them distinction (2013). In the case of a 
global order, there seems to be no ‘them’ that can function as constitutive of the ‘us’. However, 
the global order that I propose is not an expression of a pre-established common identity. It is 
the result of a balance of power between the dominant states. 
Fifth, I discuss the argument that a global order should not go beyond sovereignty (addressing 
criterion B). I argue that sovereignty is never an unilateral expression, but always a reciprocal 
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recognition of the other as an equal. By forming a global order, the constituents do re-negotiate 
the terms of sovereignty. As Meckstroth formulates it: “No assertion of ‘sovereignty’ can ever 
justify disregarding the legal order, since sovereignty is the creature of that order, rather than 
the other way around.” (Meckstroth n.d.). Also, I understand sovereignty as the power to 
constitute new forms of order. Subjecting oneself to an order that one has constituted oneself 
is not a negation, but an expression of sovereignty. 
Lastly, I conclude that a centralised global order can be legitimised on the basis of realist 
agonistic principles. Mouffe has good reasons to accept an order based on a balance of power, 
considering her ontological commitments. Her objections against cosmopolitanism do not 
hold for this order. Also, a centralised order is better suited to provide stability and contain 
conflict than Mouffe’s proposal of a decentralised order. The goal of my thesis is not to defend 
cosmopolitanism as it will be presented in the next chapter. The reason I start by discussing 
cosmopolitanism is because I think that they have a better grasp of what kind of order the 
world needs to effectively address the challenges of the 21th century. In the face of these 
challenges, cooperation is preferable over division. Therefore, I set out to investigate the 
possibilities of legitimising a global order on the basis of realist and agonistic principles. 
2. Cosmopolitanism versus Mouffe’s Realist Agonism 
This chapter explores the debate between cosmopolitanism and Mouffe. The central question 
is how the ontological starting points of both approaches lead them to think differently about 
politics and global order. Understanding this is important because it makes clear what kind of 
global order is acceptable from a realist agonistic perspective. I start by introducing 
cosmopolitanism as a branch of liberal egalitarian theory. Cosmopolitans approach the 
question of global order from the perspective of the demands of morality. Second, I elaborate 
on Mouffe’s realist agonistic critique of this approach. According to her, the focus on the moral 
aspects of politics leads cosmopolitans to negate the dimension of power and conflict in 
politics. For her, the first question of politics is about creating order and containing 
antagonistic conflict. Lastly, I stipulate the two criteria that a global order must meet to be 
acceptable for Mouffe.  
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2.1 Cosmopolitanism 
Cosmopolitanism is a term that catches a range of approaches to thinking about global order. 
Central to all these approaches is a form of moral cosmopolitanism: the idea that all human 
beings belong to the same moral community and are of equal moral worth (Kleingeld and 
Brown, 2013). This idea has been defended on both utilitarian and Kantian grounds and has 
led to various conclusions on the strength of moral obligations. For utilitarians like Singer and 
Unger, moral obligations arise from the imperative to maximise utility. They argue that 
territorial borders do not stand in the way of this consideration. All humans count equally in 
the utilitarian calculus (Bernstein 2011, 857-858). Most cosmopolitans however depart from a 
Kantian perspective.1 According to Held, justifications of cosmopolitanism ultimately derive 
from two principles that can be traced back to Kant’s moral ontology. First, cosmopolitans 
subscribe to the metaphysical position that human beings are autonomous and rational. This 
idea informs the political concept of free and equal citizens. Second, they employ the principle 
of impartial reasoning. This is expressed in for example Rawls’ original position or Habermas’ 
ideal speech situation. In these examples, humans can distil universally generalisable, 
impartial moral principles through rational discourse (Held 2010, 236-237). Impartial 
reasoning allows persons with differing views to reach an overlapping consensus that 
articulates shared interests. These two principles have informed much of 20th century liberal 
egalitarianism and democratic theory. The same principles underlie much of the cosmopolitan 
justification, without the proviso that they are only valid on a domestic level (Held 2010, 240).  
Brown and Held distinguish five interrelated topics that most cosmopolitans seek to address: 
global justice, cultural cosmopolitanism, legal cosmopolitanism, political cosmopolitanism and civic 
cosmopolitanism (2010, 9). The first question of cosmopolitan theories is often: what are our 
moral obligations towards our fellow human beings? Cosmopolitans think that the demands 
of justice pertain on a global scale. 2 Many cosmopolitans start from the viewpoint of 
distributive justice and investigate how international political institutions ought to be 
                                                          
1 Kant’s own defence of cosmopolitanism revolves around three elements. First, individuals are the 
ultimate unit of moral concern. Second, universal justice requires the broader cultivation of a 
cosmopolitan civil society. Third, the normative principles of universal justice have to be consolidated 
in cosmopolitan law (Brown 2010, 45-46).  
2 An exception here are the utilitarian cosmopolitans, since they do not define moral obligations in 
terms of justice but in terms of maximising utility (Beitz 1975, 360-361).  
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structured according to the demands of global justice (Brown & Held 2010, 9-10). Cultural 
cosmopolitanism is the field of enquiry into matters of global cultural identity. Cultural 
cosmopolitans generally assert two points. First, they recognise that all human beings have 
multiple cultural identities and affiliations and that their self-image is not tied to one specific 
culture.3 This opens up the possibility of layered cultural obligations to local, national and 
global identities. Second, cultural cosmopolitans seek to specify a number of universal human 
or cultural traits, such as reason or a requirement for basic needs. They argue that all human 
beings share an essential human culture on the basis of those universal traits (Brown & Held 
2010, 10-11). Legal cosmopolitanism concerns the argument that the international legal order 
should be based on the principles of moral cosmopolitanism. Political cosmopolitanism studies 
how international political institutions can and should reflect cosmopolitan principles. Those 
who advocate global political institutions are divided on a number of topics, such as the degree 
of centralisation or the scope and focus of global institutions. Civic cosmopolitanism asks what 
political and civic rights citizens should have under cosmopolitan political institutions and 
how a sense of cosmopolitan citizenship can be cultivated (Brown & Held 2010, 12).  
Each of these interrelated approaches emphasises different aspects of what is required to 
establish a cosmopolitan global order. Despite their differences, they are each motivated by a 
commitment to cosmopolitan moral principles. However, cosmopolitans do not only refer to 
moral arguments to defend their position. Some cosmopolitans provide empirical arguments 
in support of the view that cosmopolitan political institutions are necessary to tackle the 
challenges of globalisation. Beck argues that we have entered a ‘world risk society’ in which 
individual states are unfit to control the various unintended consequences of radicalised 
modernisation. Global problems urge increased international cooperation and a sense of 
global citizenship (Beck 2010, 228). Likewise, Held defends his proposal for global democracy 
by emphasising the practical need for increased cooperation. Global challenges like global 
warming, the spread of diseases and nuclear weapons and increasing inequality call for 
collective and collaborative action (Held 2010b). He argues that globalisation and the 
interconnectedness of economies have undermined the idea of national self-governing 
                                                          
3 On this topic, cosmopolitans find themselves in disagreement with communitarians (Taylor 1992), 
liberal-nationalists (Miller 2010) and defenders of minority rights (Kymlicka 1995). These authors, each 
in their own manner, argue that a person’s identity is strongly embedded into a single culture. They 
oppose the idea of multiple or layered cultural affiliations.  
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communities. National governments are not any longer the effective locus of political power. 
Instead, the world consists of overlapping communities of fate. Therefore, the nature and 
prospects of democratic polity need re-examination (Held 1998, 23). The establishment of a 
global democracy is the only legitimate way of setting up political institutions that will be fit 
to deal with global challenges.  
In short, cosmopolitans are motivated by either the demands of justice or pragmatic 
considerations. They approach questions about global order in terms of justice. A just global 
order is based on equal respect for human autonomy and impartial laws and norms. These 
laws and norms have to be consolidated in a global legal or political framework. The goal of 
these institutions is to protect peace and enable humanity to collectively address its common 
challenges. 
2.2 Mouffe’s Realist Agonism 
Chantal Mouffe articulates a critique of the cosmopolitan project from a realist agonistic 
perspective. I will first briefly discuss Mouffe’s political ontology. Second, I set out her critique 
of cosmopolitanism. Lastly, I reflect on the criteria that Mouffe sets out for a global order that 
is acceptable from a realist agonistic perspective. 
At the basis of Mouffe’s theory of politics stand three concepts: value pluralism, conflict and 
power. Value pluralism means that people have incommensurable values and interests (Mouffe 
2013, 3). For Mouffe, this is not merely an empirical but also an ontological condition. This 
means that the nature of values is such that they are incommensurable. Any ranking of values 
is underdetermined by reason. Competing values cannot be united in a consensus without 
favouring one value over the other. Therefore, all human societies are characterised by a 
dimension of conflict. Mouffe calls this dimension ‘the political’. The antagonism of the political 
is ineradicable and is constitutive of any society (Mouffe 2005, 8). Mouffe argues that conflict 
or difference is constitutive of identity.4 This is true both at the level of individual and 
collective identities. The formation of political identities builds on the distinction between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’. This distinction takes place on multiple levels. First, on an international level 
political societies require a collective identity that is formulated in terms of opposition to an 
                                                          
4 Mouffe is indebted here to the work of Schmitt and Derrida. This topic will be discussed in more 
detail in section 5.2. 
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outside. In this case, the us/them distinction takes the form of compatriot/foreigner. Second, 
on a domestic level political identities and interests are also formulated in opposition to a 
‘them’ (Mouffe 2005, 13). On this level, these differences are expressed by allegiance to various 
religious, political or cultural affiliations. Because of the incommensurable nature of values, 
this us/them distinction and the conflict it involves is ineradicable. Mouffe criticises liberal 
theories for suggesting that the conflict of values can be settled in a rational consensus that 
equally reflects the interests of all. What liberals present as consensus is actually a choice 
between values. This choice is not based on rational arbitration, but reflects the power relations 
in society. This means that every order is always a hegemonic order (Mouffe 2013, 14). An 
order always reflects the dominance of one value and the exclusion of others.  
According to Mouffe, the primary task of politics is the transformation of antagonism into 
agonism (Mouffe 2013, 2-3). In agonistic relations, the us/them distinction takes the form of 
limited competition rather than conflict between enemies. She defines politics as the set of 
institutions and practices that create order and organise coexistence (Mouffe 2005, 9).5 The 
main challenge for politics is to accommodate a plurality of values and offer procedures for 
limited conflict. This accommodation requires a shared commitment to a number of ethico-
political principles, such as liberty and equality. However, the interpretation of these 
regulative principles should be open for contestation. Mouffe does not propose that all forms 
of contestation have to be accepted and all forms of exclusion can be overcome. Any political 
order presupposes recognition of the symbolic ground of adversarial competition (Thaler 
2010, 790). This is the starting point of transforming antagonistic into agonistic relations. 
However, Mouffe emphasises that agonistic relations can always regress into antagonistic 
relations. This risk is especially present if there are insufficient legitimate channels to challenge 
the status quo. The suppression of difference or conflict can lead to a resurgence of antagonistic 
relations and spur violence. Therefore, any political order has to allow for difference and 
provide channels for contestation. This claim occupies a central place in Mouffe’s critique of 
cosmopolitanism, to which I shall now turn. 
 
                                                          
5 Mouffe shares an emphasis on the creation of order and preservation of stability with the school of 
political realism. I will return to this topic in chapter four.  
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Mouffe formulates a twofold critique of cosmopolitanism in the following way:  
“My main objection to the cosmopolitan approach is that, whatever its 
formulation, it postulates the availability of a world beyond hegemony and 
beyond sovereignty, therefore negating the dimension of the political.” (2013, 
19). 
I will discuss both claims subsequently. Hegemony denotes the crystallisation of some norms 
and values into a social order (Mouffe 2005, 17). Since values are plural and incommensurable, 
the choice for some values over others is always underdetermined by reason. This implies that 
every order is contingent and particular. Often however, the dominant group in the hegemonic 
order often presents its own interest as universal interests. These presentations are masked 
behind claims of impartiality, rationality, humanity or neutrality. According to Mouffe, this is 
exactly what the cosmopolitan projects amounts to. Mouffe discusses the example of George 
W. Bush who declared the ‘War on Terror’, supposedly in the name of humanity (2005, 79, 81). 
By qualifying his own project as a defence of humanity, he disqualified his opponents as 
inhuman. Cosmopolitan theory is built on a Western understanding of human rights and 
rationality. Competing and incommensurable views are disqualified as irrational. If 
cosmopolitan global institutions were ever realised, this would be the result of the imposition 
of a specific worldview on all others (Mouffe 2005, 107).  
For Mouffe, sovereignty amounts to popular sovereignty. This refers to the democratic right 
to self-government that citizens of a country possess (Mouffe 2005, 101). This includes that 
there is no higher authority in a state than the will of the people. According to Mouffe, 
cosmopolitanism threatens this sovereignty by proclaiming the universal validity of a number 
of laws or rights. She states that: “the cosmopolitan approach ends up sacrificing the old rights 
of sovereignty.” (Mouffe 2005, 101). Therefore, cosmopolitanism violates the basic principles 
of democracy. The argument that cosmopolitan laws are an expression of global sovereignty 
does not offer a way out for Mouffe. The identification of a group of people as a sovereign 
unity presupposes the existence of an ‘other’.6 This us/them distinction cannot take place on a 
global level however, because cosmopolitanism claims to encompass all of humanity. A global 
shared identity can never take hold, because there is no constitutive outside (Mouffe 2013, 23). 
                                                          
6 I elaborate on this claim in section 5.2. 
10 
 
Therefore, there can be no global demos. In sum, Mouffe’s political ontology differs 
substantially from that of cosmopolitans. She argues that the cosmopolitan project fails to 
grasp the key components of the political: pluralism, conflict and power.  
 This failure on behalf of cosmopolitanism has two related negative effects. First, hegemonic 
orders are prone to evoke violent challenges to the status quo if they do not create possibilities 
for legitimate dissent (Mouffe 2013, 20). Mouffe points towards the increasing extremism, 
fundamentalism and ethnic conflict of the past decades to invigorate this argument (Wenman 
2013, 181). This is a threat to the stability of the political order. This is problematic, since the 
goal of politics is to contain antagonistic conflict. Stability and peace are preferred to instability 
and violence. In order to contain antagonism, any order needs to provide channels for 
legitimate contestation of the status quo. This relates directly to the second problem: 
cosmopolitan institutions cannot accommodate a legitimate expression of plurality. 
Cosmopolitanism asserts the universal validity of a number values and human rights. These 
values and rights are presented as a neutral platform on which differences can be played out. 
This immediately qualifies forms of contestation that do not fit in the Western framework as 
illegitimate (Mouffe 2005, 126). Mouffe iterates that cosmopolitans are unwarranted to present 
their values as the universal standard for legitimacy. She argues that “… drawing the frontier 
between the legitimate and the illegitimate is always political, and should therefore always be 
open for contestation.” (Mouffe 2005, 121). In the cosmopolitan ideal of a world order beyond 
hegemony and beyond sovereignty, this contestation is muted. A stable and legitimate global 
order would thus have to take into account these two pitfalls of hegemony. It is important to 
note that Mouffe does not argue that hegemony itself is necessarily problematic. According to 
her, every order is inherently hegemonic (2013, 14). Hegemony becomes problematic when it 
presents itself as universal and definite rather than particular and contingent. The claim of 
universality disqualifies every contestation to that order as illegitimate. This forces 
contestation outside of the agonistic dimension of the political and back into antagonism.  
From the above we can conclude that a global order has to meet two criteria in order to be 
acceptable from a realist agonistic perspective: 
A) It has to set standards for legitimate contestation of the dominant order. This is a 
response to the objection that a centralised global order goes beyond hegemony. 
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B) It has to accommodate the democratic self-expression of sovereign peoples. This is 
a response to the objection that a centralised global order goes beyond sovereignty. 
Any order that does not meet these criteria for accommodating a legitimate expression of 
difference is likely to result in conflict rather than stability, according to Mouffe. She assumes 
that a stable and less conflictual order is preferable to a conflictual and unstable order.7 
However, this does not mean that her worries about hegemony and sovereignty are merely 
instrumental to securing order and stability. According to Mouffe, securing order and stability 
are in turn necessary for the establishment of a, as she puts it: “vibrant ‘agonistic’ public sphere 
of contestation where different hegemonic political projects can be confronted” (2005, 3). 
According to Wenman the first question of politics for Mouffe is about preserving security and 
stability and containing the conflict that is likely to arise between political actors (Wenman 
2013, 215). He argues that Mouffe has moved away from the focus on emancipation that 
characterised her earlier work (Wenman 2013, 201). In my view, the demands of stability and 
legitimacy go hand in hand. Order is a necessary precondition for the creation of legitimacy. 
A legitimate functioning of politics implies that it can accommodate difference and allows for 
the democratic self-expression of a sovereign people. This, in turn, diminishes the chances of 
antagonistic conflict. In the next chapter, I will discuss Mouffe’s proposal for a global order 
that can meet both demands. I argue that her proposal is not able to secure stability. 
3. Mouffe’s Proposal for a Multipolar Order 
This chapter discusses Mouffe’s proposal for a global order. First, I introduce Mouffe’s 
proposal for a global order organised around multiple autonomous blocks. I explain why she 
holds that a multipolar order is more stable than a cosmopolitan order. Second, I argue that a 
multipolar order as she proposes is not likely to be less conflictual than a cosmopolitan order. 
According to her own principles, antagonism can only be limited if the interaction between 
the competing blocks is based on a number of regulative principles. Therefore, even a global 
order based on multipolar distribution of power is in need of shared norms and rules if it is to 
provide stability. 
                                                          
7 It is important to note here that Mouffe takes a normative standpoint towards the proper end of 
politics. The argument that the task of politics is to transform antagonism into agonism is in itself a 
moral judgement (Thaler 2010, 795). 
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3.1  A Multipolar Order for a Multipolar world 
Mouffe rejects the cosmopolitan idea of understanding the world as a single political 
community. She objects to instituting a single legal or political framework that encompasses 
all of humanity. As an alternative, she proposes a multipolar global order consisting of a 
number of regional blocks (Mouffe 2013, 22). Such an order can be based on a multipolar 
distribution of power. In the past decades, the military and economic supremacy of the United 
States of America provided it with an hegemonic position. However, the rise of the BRICS 
countries and the unification of the European continent have changed the relative power 
position of the United States. The world is moving towards a multipolar distribution of power 
(Cooper and Flemes 2013).8 Rising powers like South Africa and Brazil increasingly take up 
the role of regional hegemons. This trend is combined with the strengthening of regional 
organisations like ASEAN and Mercosur (Mouffe 2005, 118). In Mouffe’s multipolar order, 
each pole consists of a regional block united around a shared culture and identity. The 
multipolar order consists of multiple spheres of in- and exclusion, without an overarching 
authority. In this ‘pluralisation of hegemonies’, each block is sovereign. The blocks can each 
choose their own political and economic model. Such a global order provides room for a 
plurality of understandings of human rights and self-rule (Mouffe 2013, 32). According to 
Mouffe, cultures can deal with matters of human dignity and a just social order in different 
ways. The tradition of human rights is merely one specific expression of asserting the dignity 
of a person (Mouffe 2013, 31). Western democracy and the corresponding political rights and 
institutions are merely one specific expression of ‘rule by the people’ (Mouffe 2013, 30). Not 
all of the blocks have to be embrace the Western and secular form of democracy and human 
rights. Each region can have its culturally and historically specific interpretation of these 
principles.9 
                                                          
8 This claim is not fully undisputed within the field of International Relations. Some scholars argue 
that a bipolar distribution of power is more likely to take hold than a multipolar (Cooper and Flemes 
2013, 949). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in this debate. For the sake of the argument, I 
will assume that a multipolar distribution of power is more likely to occur than a bipolar distribution.  
9 Mouffe remains unclear what the minimal standard for an acceptable interpretation of these principles is. Not 
all of these interpretations are equally pluralistic. One could object that Mouffe applies a double standard. The 
emphasis on a plurality of regional spheres on the global level seems to underplay the tolerance for difference 
within each of the regional blocks. 
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According to Mouffe, her order does not aim to beyond hegemony and beyond sovereignty. 
A multipolar order respects pluralism and sovereignty. It allows for multiple expressions of 
legitimacy. In multipolarity,none of the blocks can impose its political or economic model on 
the others. . Therefore, a multipolar order is less likely to foster the emergence of extreme forms 
of antagonism (Mouffe 2013, 29). Mouffe does not claim that all conflict will be eradicated in 
this agonistic global order. However, organising global order around a multi polarity of power 
blocks is the best way of preventing conflicts from becoming antagonistic. It is important to 
note that Mouffe does not strictly seek to transpose her theory of agonistic democracy to the 
international domain. The crucial difference is that, according to Mouffe, there is no conflictual 
consensus on a number of ethico-political principles on the global level (2013, 23). This would 
require the existence of a global political community. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
Mouffe argues that a shared identity is not available at the global level. Shared identity is 
always based on a process of inclusion and exclusion. It needs a constitutive outside. Since a 
global identity would encompass all of humanity, such a constitutive outside is absent. 
Therefore, the domain of international relations can only count on prudential agreements 
(Mouffe 2013, 23). Any attempt to try to unite the various blocks under a single framework or 
authority implies a return to hegemony. 
In short, a multipolar global order does not convergence on a single system of norms and 
values. At the same time, the sovereignty of each regional block is maintained. According to 
Mouffe, this model has the best chance of containing antagonism. In the next section, I attack 
this claim. 
3.2 Beyond Mouffe 
I argue that a global multipolar order requires a shared symbolic space for legitimate 
contestation if it is to contain antagonism. For this argument, I rely on Mouffe’s own theory of 
the transformation of antagonism into agonism. First, I will elaborate a bit more on the 
establishment and function shared symbolic space. 
On the domestic level, agonistic relations are established through a conflictual consensus on 
ethico-political principles (Mouffe 2005, 20). In this consensus, two distinctions are made. First, 
the establishment of agonism is enabled by the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This sets 
apart those who can legitimately participate in the agon, namely the ‘us’. Those who are 
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included view each other as legitimate contenders, even though they might disagree with the 
other on many political standpoints (Mouffe 2005, 20). Each contender views the other as 
equally entitled to influencing public decision making in the shared political community. The 
‘them’ are excluded from the agon and cannot, in any way, legitimately participate. This means 
that the central authority can legitimately exclude the latter category from the shared decision 
making procedures in its jurisdiction. The second distinction is between legitimate and 
illegitimate forms of sovereign self-expression. In liberal democracies, legitimate forms of 
contestation are for example, voting, protesting or civil disobedience. Rioting, terrorism and 
bribing on the other hand are considered illegitimate. For the latter category, the central 
authority reserves the right to prosecute the perpetrators. These two distinctions together 
shape a shared symbolic space of legitimate contestation. The boundaries of this shared 
symbolic space have to be open for contestation according to Mouffe. The setting of the 
boundaries of legitimate contestation is itself political. The only condition is that the 
boundaries do not violate the ethico-political principles of liberty and equality that underlie 
the concept of democracy. This configuration establishes the stability of agonistic conflict.  
Without the shared symbolic space, there would be no standard to tell legitimate from 
illegitimate forms of sovereign self-expression. This means that society would fall back into a 
state of nature. The danger of antagonistic conflict could never be averted permanently. 
According to Mouffe, this is the case in the international domain (Mouffe 2013, 23). 
Admittedly, there does not seem to be a global conflictual consensus on the principles 
underlying democracy. Liberty and equality are interpreted very differently over the world. 
These interpretations are too disparate to count as a conflictual consensus. Many states claim 
to be democratic and respect human rights. Unfortunately, even the most oppressive regimes 
assert that they rule in the name of the people.10 I will not claim that this lip-service to 
democracy and human rights counts as a conflictual consensus on ethico-political principles. 
So can antagonism be averted without a conflictual consensus on principles of liberty and 
equality?  
I argue that conflict can be contained if there is a shared symbolic space of contestation. This 
shared symbolic space consists of a common understanding of the boundaries of legitimate 
                                                          
10 Think for example about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  
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contestation. First, it sets out who can participate in the global agon. In the current global order, 
sovereign states are regarded as the main legitimate actors in global politics. States have the 
authority to sign treaties, set up international law or wage war. Increasingly, non-state actors 
are playing an important role as well. Nonetheless, non-governmental organisations or 
transnational corporations do not have the power to perform either of the above actions. States 
and none state actors enjoy different degrees legitimacy to contest the global order. In the 
international domain, states view each other as symbolic equals. They regard the other states 
as legitimate contenders to setting the rules and norms of the global order. Second, the shared 
symbolic space delineates what counts as legitimate forms of contestation. For example, the 
current international order establishes which forms of violent conflict are legitimate and which 
are not. It sets out what the appropriate forms of sovereign self-expression are under various 
conditions. Mostly, states have agreed that violence is unacceptable. However, under some 
circumstances states have a right to use violence to achieve their ends. These standards allow 
states to make claims of legitimacy. Without a common adherence to these standards, the 
international community has no means to condemn those who disturb the order. In this case, 
there would not be an argument against viewing violence and aggression as legitimate forms 
of self-expression (Thaler 2010, 794). This is a threat to the stability of that order. There would 
be no formal limitation to antagonistic conflict. 
A multipolar global order without a shared symbolic space of contestation cannot be agonistic. 
Agonism requires that actors regard the other as symbolic equals and legitimate contenders. 
This contains the exclusion of some actors and some actions. Just like on the domestic level, a 
shared symbolic space that situates the terms of interaction is necessary to create a stable order. 
This leaves us with a new question: how can a shared symbolic space be created, if not by a 
conflictual consensus on ethico-political principles? In the next chapter, I argue that a balance 
of power can create a shared symbolic space on the global level.  
4. Realism, Balance of Power and Legitimacy 
In this chapter, I start to set out my own alternative for a global order based on realist agonistic 
principles. First, I will argue that a shared symbolic space can be established through a balance 
of power. Under a balance of power, the competing actors view each other as equals. The 
rough equality in terms of power translates into a symbolic equality. This creates a shared 
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symbolic space in which the competing actors come together to set the rules of interaction. The 
second question is what legitimates the rules that states set jointly. Without a legitimation, the 
rules would amount to sheer domination by the major global powers. The question of 
legitimacy cannot be answered in terms of the ethico-political principles that underlie liberal 
democracy. As argued in the previous chapter, not all of the major powers endorse the 
principles of liberty and equality. Therefore, another narrative has to be provided. For answers 
to both issues, I will draw on the school of political realism. Mouffe shares a number of relevant 
ontological premises with political realism and there are no critical differences that divide 
them. Therefore, political realism can provide helpful insights for how a global order can be 
constituted that is acceptable for Mouffe. I will start by briefly discussing the main claims of 
political realism. Also, I explain the dynamics of the balance of power as conceived by IR-
realists. This helps us to understand how a balance of power can establish a shared symbolic 
space. 
4.1  Political Realism 
Political realism is a school in political philosophy that asserts that the study of politics should 
not be reduced to moral questions. They take issue with what they call ‘political or liberal 
moralism’ (Horton 2010, 432; Sleat 2016, 173; Williams 2005, 2). According to political realists, 
liberals such as Dworkin, Rawls and Habermas fail to acknowledge the true nature of politics. 
Like Mouffe, political realists argue that the dynamics of politics are determined by conflict, 
interest and power (Sleat 2016, 173). Many also share the ontological standpoint of value 
pluralism (Horton 2010, 436). According to realists, political moralists do not consider these 
factors to be essential to politics. Instead, they approach political questions in terms of 
morality. In the case of cosmopolitanism, we have seen that cosmopolitans are predominantly 
interested in the question which global order meets the demands of justice. Cosmopolitans 
pay less attention to the real world obstacles and attitudes that might stand in the way of 
realising such a global order. Because political moralists do not grasp the full essence of 
politics, they ask the wrong kind of questions according to political realists. This makes their 
theories descriptively deficient and largely practically irrelevant (Horton 2010, 433). One could 
argue that this critique misses the point, since political moralism is a normative and not so 
much a descriptive approach. However, it is central to the realist position that the normative 
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and descriptive dimensions of political theory cannot be seen independently from each other.11 
Any theory of politics, descriptive or normative, should take the constitutive features of 
politics as a starting point (Horton 2010, 435).  
The school of political realism in political philosophy is related to the school of realism in the 
study of international relations. Both schools are ‘realist’ because they focus on the real world 
circumstances when studying (international) politics. These real world circumstances are 
made up of struggles of power and conflicts of interests. Although the schools agree on what 
constitutes politics, they have different methodologies and research agendas (Bell 2017, 1-2). 
Realists in political theory are interested in the normative implications of their political 
ontology. For example, they ask themselves what concepts such as legitimacy, justice or rights 
amount to in a realist context. Most IR-realists on the other hand are solely concerned with the 
empirical analyses of politics.12 They study international relations broadly based on five 
assumptions (Grieco, Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2015, 72-74). First, states are the central unit 
of analysis, since they are the main actors in the international domain. Other types of 
organisation play only a secondary role. Second, these states exist in a world without a higher 
authority. In an anarchic international domain, power is the coin of the realm and states are 
fully dependent on self-help. Power is not merely the military or economic force of a state. It 
refers to the ability of states to change the behaviour of other states (Morgenthau and 
Thompson 1985, 32). Third, realists assume that states are reasonably rational actors. Realist 
rational actor models are based on cost-benefit calculations and include strategic models such 
as the prisoners dilemma. Fourth, states are first and foremost concerned with their own 
security. The bare essentials of politics are about power and survival. Lastly, realists argue that 
conflict is inherent in relations amongst states. States always seek to secure their position 
relative to others. This leads to competition and possibly, conflict.  
These five assumptions provide realists with a number of conceptual tools to analyse 
international politics. One core propositions is that the dynamic between states is governed by 
the balance of power (Grieco, Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2015, 74). In order to secure their 
                                                          
11 For a critical discussion of this claim, see (Erman & Möller, forthcoming).  
12 An exception are classical realists like Morgenthau. He argues that good foreign policy is rational 
policy based on the self-interest of states (Morgenthau and Thompson 1985, 10). Later, neo-realist 
scholars mostly refrained from conflating their empirical research with advocating Realpolitik.  
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own position, states will seek to increase their power vis à vis possible rivals. They can do so 
by increasing their own economic, military or diplomatic power. Another option is to form 
alliances with other states. An example of this dynamic is the formation of the Triple Entente 
and the Axis Powers prior to World War I. If all actors pursue these tactics, this can lead to a 
balance of power. Some realists defend the thesis that a balance of power has considerable 
benefits for security and stability and that it is a condition for peace.13 Containing possible 
rivals through a balance of power is often less costly and risky than trying to overpower them. 
Other realists however argue that hegemony, the dominance of a single state over others, 
allows for more sustainable peace (Grieco, Ikenberry and Mastanduno 2015, 177).14  
A second analytical tool is the concept of the security dilemma (Grieco, Ikenberry and 
Mastanduno 2015, 74-75). The conditions of anarchy and insecurity lead states to mistrust the 
intentions of other states. The build-up of military forces for defensive purposes of one state 
can trigger an arms race, increase tensions and eventually escalate into violent conflict. 
Communication and cooperation between states can dampen the insecurity over the intentions 
of other states and prevent a spiral of violence. These insights from IR-realism help us to 
understand why a balance of power can lead to stability on the international domain. It also 
shows us that balances are fragile because of the lack of trust between states. A global order 
based on realist principles will have to consider these dynamics. 
Despite their differences, both versions of realism can help us to think about establishing and 
legitimising a global order based on realist agonistic principles. As mentioned above, Mouffe 
shares a number of relevant premises with realism. Both Mouffe and realists argue that politics 
revolves around struggles for power and conflicts of interests. As I will discuss in the last 
section of this chapter, they also agree that the first task of politics is about limiting conflict 
and imposing order and stability (Mouffe 2013, 8-9; Williams 2005, 3). Because of these 
similarities, I hold that I can use the realist tools to support my thesis. In the subsequent two 
                                                          
13 Kenneth Waltz famously defended the position that Iran should be allowed to develop nuclear 
weapons in order to counter the military might of Israel in the Middle East. Such a balance of power 
would provide more stability than a situation in which only one state possesses nuclear weapons 
(Waltz 2012).  
14 Note that, although the concepts are related, hegemony in the context of IR means something 
different than Mouffe’s concept of hegemony.  
19 
 
sections I will discuss how an international order can be respectively founded and legitimised 
based on realist principles. 
4.2  Balance of Power and the Constitution of a Global Order 
We concluded the previous chapter with the claim that a balance of power can establish a 
shared symbolic space on which contestation takes place. In the section above, I introduced 
the concept of a balance of power. In this section, I argue that a rough equality of real power 
can translate into a symbolic equality. This is the starting point for the constitution of a shared 
symbolic space of contestation. 
In a balance of power between states, none of the states has the capacity to overpower the 
others. At the same time, states face the threat that other states might form alliances against 
them. Under a balance of power, all parties are confronted with constant insecurity and the 
threat of conflict. In this situation, the states have prudential reasons to retain stability. Any 
attempt to overpower the others would only inflict harm on oneself, without leading to any 
gains. Rather than seeking security by overpowering the other, states have to come to terms 
with each other. 15 It is important to note here that a balance of power consists of an 
intersubjective interpretation of rough equal power. This means that there does not have to be 
an exact de facto equality of power. Rather, a balance of power arises if two or multiple parties 
regard the others as rough equals. All parties recognise that they have to accept the other as a 
contender for influence in the international domain. This creates a symbolic equality. It is 
symbolic, because the relative identities of the competing actors are changed. In a balance of 
power, the other is not someone who has to be surmounted. It is someone who has to be 
accommodated. This changes the identity of the other from enemy to adversary. In Mouffe, 
this transformation is guided by a common adherence to ethico-political principles. In a 
balance of power, the transformation is imbedded by the recognition that the other cannot be 
                                                          
15 Horton argues that actors can have a range of motivations to come to terms with others. Cultural, 
moral or pragmatic reasons might motivate states to institute a modus vivendi (Horton 2010, 440). I 
agree with this position. I do not contend here that states are solely motivated by a narrow definition 
of self-interest. Strictly, I do not argue that a balance of power provides states with the only correct 
motivation for constituting a global order. Rather, a balance of power provides the correct background 
conditions against which a stable political settlement can take hold. This is because under a balance of 
power, the question of how to organise international relations needs to be answered by an 
intersubjective agreement.  
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overcome. It is important to note that the transformation is not permanent. An adversary is 
friend nor enemy.16 The identity of enemy still underlies the identity of adversary and may 
become salient. Mouffe emphasises this as well when she states that agonistic relations can 
regress into antagonistic relations (2005, 21). An adversarial relation between states can still 
harbour mistrust. The other still represents a threat to ones interests. There is a relevant 
difference however between enemies and adversaries. Between enemies, the survival of the 
one implies the defeat of the other. Between adversaries on the other hand, survival is not a 
zero-sum game. Adversaries are committed to finding a common solution to the difficulties of 
cooperation. This is the situation state are in under a balance of power. 
The first question that arises is: who are accepted as contenders for influence in the global 
domain and who are not? Answering this question is the first step in setting the boundaries of 
the shared symbolic space of contestation. The question who is allowed to enter the shared 
common ground cannot be answered in terms of pre-established authority or universal right. 
Our assumption is that there is no consensus between the competing states on these matters. 
The new order is constituted ex nihilo. Rather, who has access to the global agon depends on 
the intersubjective interpretation of the distribution of power. As Meckstroth puts it: “Those 
who write the law of the world do so not by right but because they are strong enough to stop 
anyone from writing it without them.” (Meckstroth n.d., 9). Those that make up the balance of 
power decide amongst themselves who they accept as contenders in the global agon. In the 
first place, that includes all those who can compete on the highest level and can make 
themselves indispensable for a stable order. In the second place, the great powers can decide 
to include lesser powers. Meckstroth provides the example of the Treaty of Westphalia, which 
was struck between the major powers of Europe in 1648. The great powers made sure to 
include minor powers in the new legal order as well. The great powers can do so for a variety 
of reasons. It is important however to remark that the status of the lesser powers depends on 
the voluntary inclusion of the great powers (Meckstroth n.d., 10). In short, there is no single 
actor or authority that decides the boundaries of the shared symbolic space.  
                                                          
16 Mouffe draws on the work of Carl Schmitt for concept of agonistic relations. For him, politics can 
only be understood in terms of friend/enemy groupings (Schmitt 1976, 35). Mouffe disagrees with 
Schmitt and argues that not all others are necessarily enemies.  
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These actors subsequently constitute a new order, including the terms of legitimate interaction. 
By ‘subsequently’, I do not simply mean to imply a temporal sequence of events. Although the 
constitution of a new order will often take place over a stretch of time, the whole process is 
best understood as a single act. The consecution in which I present the steps of the process 
indicates the relation between the different layers of the new order. I identify three layers: the 
real order, the symbolic order and the legal order.17 The real order is the real balance of power 
that provides the background conditions against which the symbolic order is formed. The 
symbolic order is the shared symbolic space, in which the competing actors recognise each 
other as legitimate contenders in the global agon. The legal order is the set of agreed upon 
rules that regulate the interaction between the contenders. This order can only be effective if it 
is backed up by the real order. Ultimately, the legal has to be able to be enforced by real power. 
This does not mean that the threat of violence needs to be ever present. Just like in the domestic 
legal order, the day to day routine functions without this threat. However, the state ultimately 
needs to sustain the credible image that it can back up its laws with real force if necessary. The 
same holds for the international domain. This implies two things. First, the constituents of the 
global order need to uphold the idea that they are willing to resort to force to protect the legal 
order. They can do so by adopting an agreement in the legal order that each of the constituents 
has an obligation to protect it.18 Another option is that the constituents appoint an external 
authority as guardian of the order. A second consequence is that a redistribution of power in 
the real order can lead to a renegotiation of the legal order (Meckstroth n.d., 15). The 
transformation from enemy to adversary is not necessarily permanent. If the balance of power 
shifts, new actors with different interests might demand access to the negotiation table. This 
implies that the legal order is never set in stone.  
For Mouffe, it is a shortcoming of the international domain that it can only count on 
conditional agreements. According to her, “All attempts, through the establishment of a global 
covenant, to definitively overcome the ‘state of nature’ between states runs into 
insurmountable difficulties.” (Mouffe 2013, 23). However, the global agonistic order I propose 
does not aim to definitively overcome the state of nature. I recognise that the stability of the 
                                                          
17 Meckstroth calls these respectively the real power, the constituting power and the constituted power 
(n.d.).  
18 Agreements like this can be found in the charter of the NATO (article five) and the United Nations 
(article 51).  
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order is never unconditional. The boundaries of the shared symbolic space can be challenged 
and renegotiated. I will elaborate on this point in the next chapter. Before doing so, I will 
discuss the objection that this order implies a simple ‘might makes right’. In the next section, 
I set out what legitimacy means from a realist perspective and how this applies to the founding 
of a global order. 
4.3  A Realist Account of Legitimacy for a Global Order 
I have discussed how a global order can be established on the basis of realist agonistic 
principles. However, the goal of my thesis is to show that a global order can also be legitimised 
on the basis of these principles. Without an account of legitimacy, the global order amounts to 
sheer dominance of the great powers. First, I will introduce a political realist approach to 
legitimacy. Second, I discuss how this account of legitimacy applies to the case of a global 
order found on a balance of power. A balance of power provides the right background 
conditions against which a global legal order can be legitimised. 
Political realists formulate their theory of legitimate authority in contrast to, what they call, 
moralistic approaches. Although there is some variance between different political realists, 
two themes are central to a realist account of legitimacy. First, they argue that the demand for 
legitimacy is political rather than moral. Second, they hold that the threshold of legitimacy is 
context dependent. I discuss both claims consecutively. What distinguishes political rule from 
sheer dominance is that political rule can offer an account of legitimacy (Sleat 2016, 176). This 
means that those in power need to be able to justify to those who are coerced why they have 
to accept this. So far, realists and moralists are on common ground. However, they disagree 
over why this legitimation needs to be provided. For moralists, the legitimation demand 
derives from moral principles. Illegitimate coercion is impermissible because it does not meet 
normative standards such as respecting the liberty and equality of individuals (Larmore 1999, 
607). Realists argue that the demand for legitimacy comes from within politics itself. An 
account of legitimacy is necessary, simply because power does not justify itself (Sleat 2014, 
322). One could retort that this leaves out the question why legitimate rule is preferable over 
sheer dominance. Morgenthau offers an instrumental answer; one that is similar to Mouffe’s 
approach. He argues that legitimate rule is more stable than illegitimate rule, since decreases 
the chances of revolt against the authority (Morgenthau and Thompson 1985). Another answer 
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might be that we can reasonably expect those who are coerced to demand a justification 
(Williams 2005, 6). It is likely that those who are coerced will not bluntly accept this without 
explanation. However, this is not the central point of the realist account of legitimacy (or this 
thesis). What matters is that coercion without legitimacy is simply not political rule. Therefore, 
if we want political rule (for whatever reasons), we need an account of legitimacy. Still, it is 
important to acknowledge that the demand for legitimacy is not dictated by morality. This 
opens up the possibility of a plurality of accounts of legitimacy. 
Political realists contend that the terms in which political rule is legitimised are affected by 
historic circumstances (Williams 2005, 3). For Williams, the basic condition for legitimacy is 
that an authority can answer the first question of politics: the authority needs to “secure the 
terms of order, protection, safety, trust and the conditions of cooperation.” (Williams 2005, 3).19 
Without answering this question, there is no platform on which further political issues can be 
addressed. Williams calls this the Basic Legitimation Demand (2005, 4). Meeting this demand 
is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for legitimacy. A further condition is that the way 
that the authority answers the BLD must be acceptable for those that are coerced. What is 
acceptable however, is historically affected. Williams argues that the liberal justification of 
authority is a contingent product of modernity (2005, 9). Under different historic 
circumstances, other legitimations make sense to people. Those legitimations can draw on 
moral, religious, economic or other sources. Sleat argues: “The search for universal grounds of 
legitimate rule that will be true for all people in all places and times will necessarily be a 
misguided endeavour.” (2016, 176). Because Sleat subscribes to value pluralism, he thinks that 
there is no single answer that can be expected to be universally acceptable. What counts is that 
a given account of legitimacy is congruent with the beliefs of the people that it is offered to. 
Contrary to many liberal theories, not the de facto agreement, but the acceptability matters 
(Sleat 2014, 325-326). The threshold is set at rough equal acceptability to each subject (Williams 
2005, 7). As a consequence, the legitimation of authority is a continuous project. An order will 
never be considered fully legitimate, since it is impossible to provide an account that is equally 
acceptable to all. The BLD cannot be provided a final answer. This resonates with Mouffe’s 
claim that the discussion on the boundaries of legitimacy will always be political (Mouffe 2005, 
                                                          
19 This standpoint is similar to Mouffe’s argument that politics consists of instituting the terms under 
which antagonistic conflict can be transformed into ordered and contained agonism.  
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121). This point is emphasised in the next chapter. I will now turn to how this account of 
legitimacy applies to a global order based on a balance of power. 
A global order also faces the Basic Legitimation Demand. The constitutive powers can demand 
a justification for the legal order from each other. As we have seen, realists argue that this 
justification is context dependent. I have also shown that the constitution of a global order 
based on a balance of power creates a new context. The constitutive powers cannot revert to 
pre-established authority or universal right. This means that the legitimation of a global order 
will have to find its sources in its own constitutive process. A legitimation of the global order 
will have to do two things. First, it needs to justify why those coerced by the legal order should 
accept its authority. Second, it needs to set limits to the shared symbolic space of contestation. 
As discussed in section 3.2, this means that it should provide an account of which forms of 
contestation of the legal order are legitimate or illegitimate. The symbolic order in which states 
recognise each other as equals can form a fruitful ground for a legitimation. In this context, the 
condition of rough equal acceptability is not a moral demand, but a practical one. Under a 
balance of power, none of the constitutive powers can deny any of the other constituents the 
position to challenge the legal order. This provides an effective barrier against any attempt to 
close off the discussion on the boundaries of the shared symbolic space. This clearly differs 
from a legal order that is based on a hegemonic real order. In such a situation, the power to set 
the standards of legitimacy is reserved by a single actor. Therefore, the hegemonic real power 
has little incentive to provide a roughly equally acceptable answer to a BLD. In the case of a 
balance of power, none of the constituents can unilaterally reserve the right to set the limits of 
legitimate contestation. Because an account of legitimacy is dependent on the rough 
acceptability for all, the value of equal voice could be newly created in this context. This can 
be a powerful value in the legitimation of a global legal order. 
One could object that this merely considers the great powers that constitute the legal order. 
Those who do not have the real power to make an effective BLD could simply be denied access 
to the symbolic order and the right to challenge the legitimacy of the legal order. However, 
the lesser powers might team up to have greater leverage to enforce their demand to be 
answered. As discussed in section 4.1, states often form alliances to restore imbalances of 
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power.20 Together, they can demand that each of them has a formal right to a voice in the legal 
order. However, there might be all sorts of practical obstacles to the formation of such an 
alliance. Another option is that the great powers will demand the recognition of the lesser 
powers that they regard as their allies. As Mouffe remarks, the great powers often act as 
regional powers with their own sphere of influence (2005, 118). In historic examples, greater 
powers have made a point of including lesser powers in constituting legal orders for matters 
of stability (Meckstroth n.d., 8). Still, just like the greater powers, the smaller powers depend 
for their rights on the recognition of others. I elaborate on this in the remainder of this thesis. 
I have argued that a balance of power provides the right background conditions for coming 
up with a legitimation that is roughly acceptable for all. So far, I have said little about the 
content of such a legitimation. For the defence of my thesis, I do not need to provide a precise 
content of the account of legitimacy. My argument is that a global order can be legitimised, 
based on principles that are acceptable to the constituents. What these principles are, is strictly 
not relevant. However, in the context of a balance of power some degree of equal voice and 
contestability of the legal order are indispensable to answer the first question of politics. Also, 
the limits of the shared symbolic space can never be closed off permanently. The boundaries 
of legitimate contestation are themselves subject to the intersubjective agreement of those that 
make up the symbolic order.  
This is an account of how a global order can be legitimised based on realist principles. I want 
to highlight two important features of the order: that it is an order and that it is centralised. It is 
an order in the most literal sense. It provides a ranking to values that are in essence 
incommensurable. As Mouffe argues, an order is a crystallisation of power relations and social 
practices (2003, 17). In practice, this means that it establishes rules and sets limits. The global 
order organises a domain that is in itself unorganised. It is also centralised. In Mouffe’s 
proposal, the multipolar distribution of power in the real order is congruent with multiple 
independent legal orders that exist next to each other. Although the regional blocks can make 
prudential agreements, the order remains decentralised. I have argued that an agreement on 
shared norms and rules is both possible and necessary for containing conflict. I contend that 
                                                          
20 A real world example of such an alliance is the Group of 77. This is a group of 77 developing 
countries that have joined diplomatic forces to increase their leverage in the United Nations. 
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states can decide to instantiate centralised, supranational authorities. Such an authority is 
centralised in two senses. First, it facilitates the shared decision making of the legal order. It is 
essential to my proposal that none of the major powers can unilaterally set the terms of 
interaction. This makes that decisions can only be made by an intersubjective agreement. 
Second, it can function as an institution that enforces the legal order. The constituents can 
either create an independent supranational force to back up the legal order or agree that the 
supranational authority can call on the constituents’ military forces. This makes the order 
centralised rather than decentralised. 
Now, I need to show that such an order is also acceptable from the perspective of Mouffe’s 
realist agonism. In the coming two chapters I argue that the global order can accommodate 
Mouffe’s objections. First, I contend that the global order I propose does not pretend to go 
beyond hegemony (A). Second, I argue it does not go beyond sovereignty (B). 
5. On Hegemony 
Mouffe argues that a centralised global order falsely presents the possibility of a world beyond 
hegemony. According to her, cosmopolitanism claims to be universally valid and fully 
inclusive. This negates the chances for legitimate contestation of the status quo. I defend the 
claim that a centralised global order does not necessarily aim to go beyond hegemony. Rather, 
my proposal for a global order is constructed around the idea that it is particular and 
contingent. To support this claim, I provide answers to the two pillars of Mouffe’s objection 
A. First, I argue that a centralised global order can provide channels for legitimate contestation. 
Second, I contend that a global order does not presuppose a shared global identity such as the 
cosmopolitans suggest. 
5.1 Hegemony and Contestability 
A centralised global order does not necessarily aim to go beyond hegemony. To understand 
this, we need to take a closer look at the purport of Mouffe’s objection against hegemony. The 
problem lies not with the hegemonic character of a global order as such. According to Mouffe, 
every form of order is hegemonic (2013, 14). Because values are incommensurable, any order 
is always underdetermined by reason. The choice of one value over another therefore always 
reflects relations of power. Mouffe states: “Things could always be otherwise, and therefore 
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order is predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities.” (2005, 19). As mentioned in chapter 
two, hegemony becomes problematic when it presents itself as universal and definite rather 
than particular and contingent. An order that presents its own norms and rules as 
unquestionable condemns challenges to that order as illegitimate. This is unacceptable for 
Mouffe, since this increases the chances of antagonism. What would be acceptable for Mouffe, 
is a hegemonic order that allows for contestation of its norms and rules. The global order I 
propose meets this standard. 
I will consider two categories: contestation by those who are considered legitimate contenders 
and by those who are considered illegitimate contenders. In both categories, I discuss actors 
that are not regarded as rough equals in the symbolic order. This means that their way of 
entrance into shared decision making depends on the recognition by the established order. I 
have already provided an upshot for the possibility of contestation by the first group in the 
previous chapter. Legitimate contenders are all those who are regarded as such by the others. 
This is expressed in the symbolic and/or the legal order. In first instance, the great powers 
consider each other as legitimate in the symbolic order. This rough equality will be reflected 
in the legal order. Here, the constituents can also decide to record the legitimacy of other actors 
who cannot make a case for themselves. The legal order does not only circumscribe who can 
legitimately contest, but also which forms of contestation are accepted. A balance of power 
ensures that no single actor has the power to enforce its view of legitimacy on the others. This 
de facto contestability can translate into a legal provision for the contestability of the order. 
Each of the contenders will demand a fair and equal chance to influence the legal order. This 
can lead to the acceptance of norms such as equal voice. The actors might not accept these 
values in their domestic policy. However, on the global level they have reasons to adopt such 
procedural norms since an account of legitimacy must be roughly acceptable for all. Thus, 
those who are considered legitimate have means to legitimately challenge the terms of the 
legal order. 
But what about those who are not regarded as legitimate contenders on the global level? How 
can those who are excluded from the shared decision making find ways to contest the global 
order? In first instance, an excluded actor can ask a justification for why it is not allowed to 
take part in shared decision making procedures. In other words, it can make a BLD to the legal 
order. It can invigorate its demand by appealing to principles that are accepted by the legal 
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order. If the legal order has placed the boundary of legitimacy based on certain criteria, the 
actor can try to prove that it meets those criteria. We can imagine a region that wants to secede 
and form an independent state. This aspiring state can argue that is has all the characteristics 
of a state and should therefore be granted the same rights that are given to other states by the 
legal order. This is a process that occurs in the negotiations about the status of for example 
Kosovo or South Sudan. It might also seek to argue that the criteria are unjustified. However, 
this method does not guarantee success. Even if an actor would be able to provide a perfectly 
coherent argument why it should be included, the established order could decide to ignore it. 
Another option is that the actor does not wish to appeal to the standards of legitimacy of the 
established order. Some actors might radically disagree with these standards. In such cases, 
the actor can only resort to means of contestation that are deemed illegitimate by the legal 
order. However, this will probably only create distance between that actor and the established 
order. The actor is likely to remain excluded.  
One could object that this defeats my argument. Since some actors are excluded, the global 
order is not able to accommodate contestation of its own principles. However, this is not the 
case. To iterate, every order is hegemonic (Mouffe 2013, 14). That means that there will always 
be boundaries that exclude some actors. What matters is that these boundaries are contestable. 
This is the case for the order I propose. Moreover, the barrier for legitimate contestation is 
quite low in an order based on a balance of power. This has two reasons. First, the stability of 
the underlying real order is fragile. As discussed in section 4.1, a lack of knowledge about the 
intentions of the other creates distrust among actors. To maintain stability, the order has to 
minimise the risk of contestation becoming antagonistic. Even less powerful actors can disrupt 
a fragile balance of power. Because of the forming of alliances, greater powers can be dragged 
into conflicts amongst each other. For this reason, the established order has reasons to try and 
accommodate outsiders rather than to render them illegitimate. Second, the legal order is not 
presented as universal. Because the legal order is based on conflicting interests, it can never 
claim to be universal. Every legal order has to recognise its particularity. Claiming universality 
would antagonise some of the great powers. As discussed in section 4.2, none of the great 
powers can be denied the position to challenge the legal order. For Mouffe, a claim to 
universality forecloses the possibility of legitimate challenges to the legal order. Because the 
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particularity of the order is acknowledged, it is also inherently contestable. These two factors 
lower the barrier for legitimate contestation. 
If these provisions are met, a global order does not aim to go beyond hegemony. Like Mouffe, 
I do not contend that a global order can overcome exclusion or prevent all violence. A global 
order will be hegemonic. This also means that alterations of the legal order are more likely to 
be incremental than radical. Unless the balance of power in the real order shifts rapidly, radical 
changes of the legal order are not likely to occur. Nonetheless, the boundaries of legitimacy 
are contestable.  
5.2 Global Identity 
We have already encountered Mouffe’s argument against the formation of a global order 
based on the lack of a global identity. According to Mouffe, a political or agonistic order can 
only be constructed around a shared identity. Collective identities are always formulated as a 
“we” in opposition to a “them”. In the case of a global order, there seems to be no ‘them’ that 
can function as constitutive of the ‘us’. Therefore, a global order based on a “we” that truly 
encompasses all of humanity can never be established. In her own words: 
“What is important to acknowledge is that the very condition of possibility of 
the formation of political identities is at the same time the condition of 
impossibility of a society from which antagonism can be eliminated.” (Mouffe 
2013, 5).  
The critique by Mouffe makes sense in the light of cosmopolitan claims to a common human 
identity, as discussed in section 2.1. For example, cultural cosmopolitans state that there are 
common, universal human traits that can justify the establishment of a global order. Such a 
claim to universality is indeed objectionable from Mouffe’s perspective. A claim to universal 
validity negates that all orders are particular. However, I seek to construct a world order on 
the basis of different grounds than the cosmopolitans. I argue that a centralised global political 
order is not conditional on a shared political identity based on universal traits of humanity. 
The constitution of the global order is not an expression of a pre-established common identity, 
but a result of the recognition of a balance of power. This does not aim to overcome the 
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difference in identities of the constituents. First, I highlight that a collective identity does not 
negate underlying differences. 
For Mouffe, the possibility of creating collective political identities is based on the encounter 
with others (Mouffe 2013, 7-8). An encounter with an other always results in the classification 
of the other as either similar or different. In which category the other is placed depends on the 
forms of identification that become salient through the encounter. In some circumstances, an 
other is part of a larger “we” in contrast to an external “them”. That same other might be a 
“them” under different circumstances. According to this logic, the encounter with an other can 
lead to an identification as similar in one specific regard, without negating the differences in 
other aspects. This is important to point out, because it implies that a global order that is based 
on one specific form of identification does not rule out difference in many other respects. The 
identification of rough equality of actors in the symbolic order is only a specific kind of 
identification. Under the circumstances of the international domain, some traits become salient 
for a shared identity and others not. Still, Mouffe could respond that the circumstances do not 
allow for an identification of similarity, since there is no external other against which these 
traits can become salient. However, this argument depends on a false analogy between 
individual and collective identity (Abizadeh 2005).  
For Mouffe, the logic of identity formation is similar in individuals and collectives. For both, 
what Abizadeh calls the ‘particularity thesis’ obtains. This thesis implies that the formation of 
an identity requires an external other against which it can take shape (Abizadeh 2005, 47). 
Abizadeh takes issue with the particularity thesis for the formation of collective identities. He 
argues that the “other” that is required for the formation of collective identities does not 
necessarily need to be external. He states: 
“But the recognition required by a collective identity can come solely from the 
(other) individuals who make up that collectivity— an option that would not 
analogously be available for the development of individual identity 
itself.”(Abizadeh 2005, 48).  
According to Abizadeh, there is no reason to assume that “other” must necessarily imply 
“outsider”. The recognition of similarities can take shape between those that share a trait. For 
example, imagine we have a group of people who all like to listen to The Beatles. According 
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to Mouffe’s particularity thesis, these people would not collectively identify as Beatles fans 
unless they would encounter a group of Rolling Stones fans. However, internal recognition of 
the fact that each of the group members likes to listen to The Beatles is a sufficient condition 
for them to collectively identify as Beatles fans. This similarity can become salient 
independently of the presence of an external other. It does require the conceptual availability 
of not being a Beatles fan. However, this conceptual availability can also be established in 
contrast to a previous self at a time when one was not yet a Beatles fan. The presence of an 
external other is not necessary for this self or collective identification. 
This implies that states can identify with each other as rough equals in the symbolic order. The 
intersubjective estimation of rough equal power forms a kind of collective identity. This 
collective identity is not prior the encounter between the actors. The identification of similarity 
between major powers takes place in the encounter between them. This creates a sense of “us” 
that can function as a starting point for collectively founding a global order and the 
containment of antagonism. This “us” is not based on supposedly universal human traits. In 
this respect it differs from the cosmopolitan formulation of a global collective identity. The 
identification of similarity is not accompanied by any claim on universal validity. Rather, it is 
a contingent expression of rough equality in a balance of power. This counters Mouffe’s 
objection that a global order cannot be formed without negating difference. As I have argued, 
the formation of a global identity does not negate difference. Similarities in one respect allow 
for difference in many others.  
I have argued that a global order does not necessarily aim to go beyond hegemony. Rather, a 
global order based on a balance of powers recognises that all orders are hegemonic. It does not 
aim to overcome difference by appealing to the universal validity of the legal order. The 
boundaries of legitimacy are always contestable. Also, the sense of “we” that Mouffe argues is 
necessary for the containment of antagonism does not rest on a universal global identity. It is 
the recognition of similarity through the encounter between rough equals. My proposal for a 
global order is constructed around the idea that it’s content is contingent and particular rather 
than universal and definite. In the next chapter, I discuss the objection about sovereignty. 
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6. On Sovereignty 
Mouffe’s second objection against cosmopolitanism (B) is that it aims to go beyond 
sovereignty. A centralised global order would undermine the democratic right to self-
government. She writes: “By justifying the right for international institutions to undermine 
sovereignty in order to uphold cosmopolitan law, it denies the democratic rights of self-
government for the citizens of many countries” (Mouffe 2005, 101). I argue that the right to 
self-government is dependent on the existence of an order that grants these rights. To grasp 
the purport of this argument, I start by discussing the various aspects of sovereignty. I contrast 
internal and external sovereignty and show how they are related. Second, I discuss the 
consequences of this view of sovereignty for Mouffe’s argument. I contend that popular 
sovereignty can only exist if the people also enjoy external recognition of their sovereignty. 
This counters Mouffe’s objection B. A centralised global order does not go beyond sovereignty, 
but is a necessary condition for its existence. Also, sovereignty is located in the constituent 
power of those that co-author the global legal order. 
6.1 Internal and External Sovereignty 
The concept of sovereignty is usually unpacked in internal and external sovereignty. Although 
they are distinct, they cannot be seen apart from each other. I will elaborate on both and discuss 
how they are related. Internal sovereignty denotes the supreme authority within a given 
territory (Bull 1977, 8). It can be given shape in different ways. Bodin equalled internal 
sovereignty to “the highest power in command” (Bodin 1992). For him, the sovereign is the 
one who can coerce and subject others. Like Hobbes, he thought that this power ought to reside 
in a single agent. The agent could be an individual or a body of individuals. This form of 
internal sovereignty can be contrasted with popular sovereignty. This means that the ultimate 
power to constitute new rules of political organisation is in the hands of the people. Rousseau 
described this as living under the law that one has created oneself. In short, popular 
sovereignty is a form of internal sovereignty. Rule by the people, or the right to self-
government as Mouffe calls it, means that the people are the highest authority in the given 
territory. This can only be the case if there is no supreme external authority in the first place. 
Thus, popular sovereignty can only exist when there is internal sovereignty. 
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The concept of popular sovereignty is often linked with constituent power. The constituent 
power is the actor who “determines the constitutional form, the juridical and political identity, 
and the governmental structure of a community in its entirety.” (Kalyvas 2005, 226). In other 
words, the constituent power refers to the power to create new forms of political organisation 
such as a state or a global order. This highlights an important aspect of sovereignty. Although 
the people subject themselves to the authority of the law, the constituent sovereign power 
remains prior and outside of the constituted order (Kalyvas 2005, 227). For Hobbes and 
Rousseau, the constituent power resides only in the state of nature. Through the establishment 
of a social contract the constituent power is lifted to a constituted power. For them, this is a 
transition that occurs only one time. In contrast, I argue that the constituent power is not 
subdued once an order is established. The constituted order can be renegotiated and new 
forms of cooperation can be established. In this sense, the constituent power is sovereign. The 
power to constitute an order does not depend on any prior contract or legal status. This means 
that constituent power can also not be denied to any group on the basis of a previous 
agreement. This important for the argument I develop in the next section. 
External sovereignty is defined as independence from external authorities (Bull 1977, 8). 
Krasner subdivides external sovereignty in two aspects: international legal sovereignty and 
Westphalian sovereignty (Krasner 1999, 3-4). Westphalian sovereignty indicates the exclusion 
of external actors from the authority structures of a territory. This means that the government 
of a state is the sole arbiter of legitimate behaviour within its territory (Krasner 1999, 20). It is 
also known as the principle of non-intervention.21 According to Krasner, this is related but not 
identical to international legal sovereignty (2005, 4). This refers to the practice of mutual 
recognition of juridical independence between states. The recognition of juridical 
independence is the entrance ticket to international law and diplomacy. It denotes that this 
actor has the authority to sign treaties and take part in international organisations. The aspect 
of mutual recognition is central to the modern understanding of sovereignty. Moreover, I 
argue that mutual recognition is a necessary condition for the practice of exercising ultimate 
authority in a territory under conditions of multi polarity.  
                                                          
21 Although the principle of non-intervention is often linked to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, it was 
only first explicated by Wolff and Vattel in the 18th century (Krasner 1999, 20-21). 
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Internal sovereignty can only be exercised if the sovereignty of that political community is 
respected by external factors. That means that they refrain from interfering with the internal 
affairs of others. Sovereignty is not a natural right, but a concept that requires recognition in a 
legal order. As Meckstroth puts it: “‘Sovereignty’ is a legal term and sovereignty in a state of 
nature, or in the midst of a world war, is a contradiction in terms.” (n.d., 14). An unilateral 
proclamation of sovereignty signifies little if it is not respected by other actors. A claim to 
supreme authority in a given territory (internal sovereignty) can only be effective if external 
actors refrain from uninvited interfering in that authority structure (Westphalian sovereignty). 
This implies that the others have to recognise that state as sovereign.22 So which of the two is 
prior? This relates directly to the way in which an order is constituted, as discussed in chapter 
four. Both internal and external sovereignty are constituted in the same act. The sovereignty 
of the constitutive powers is affirmed through the recognition of each other as such 
(Meckstroth n.d., 10). As discussed in section 4.2, the founding of a global order does not 
depend on a pre-established authority or universal right. The symbolic equality between 
roughly equal powers lies at the bottom of the constitution of a global order. The different 
degrees of sovereignty that states will enjoy are part of the legal order that they constitute. 
Thus, internal sovereignty depends on external sovereignty. 
Abizadeh objects to this that internal sovereignty does not necessarily presuppose an external 
other. He argues that the combination of internal and external sovereignty is a historical 
contingency (Abizadeh 2005, 49). There is no conceptual constraint on the formation of a global 
sovereign. A global sovereign could exist as an unilateral expression, since there is no other 
that has to respect that sovereignty. Mouffe objects to the conceptual possibility of a global 
sovereign for familiar reasons that have been explored in the previous chapter. My argument 
takes a different turn. I do not think that internal sovereignty conceptually presupposes an 
external other. However, in the case of multiple actors, such as in the situation of multi 
polarity, sovereignty can only exist by the grace of mutual recognition. I do not defend the 
cosmopolitan ideal of a global democracy of humanity that expresses a unified sovereign will. 
My arguments develops under circumstances in which there are multiple competing actors. 
                                                          
22 Another option is that the external actor has no wish to interfere in that state. However, this is not sufficient 
for internal sovereignty. Internal sovereignty does not simply mean the absence of arbitrary interference. It 
implies that a state has a certain degree of guarantee against the arbitrary interference of others. This 
guarantee is provided by the recognition of a state as sovereign. 
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In these conditions, internal sovereignty presupposes mutual recognition. In this sense, I agree 
with Abizadeh that the concept of sovereignty is historically contingent. Under different 
circumstances, sovereignty might get another meaning. I will now turn to the purport of this 
view of sovereignty for Mouffe’s objection B. 
6.2  Mouffe’s Objection B Reconsidered 
As discussed in the previous section, sovereignty depends on the embeddedness in an order. 
Therefore, a centralised global order does not go beyond sovereignty. Rather, it is a pre-
condition for the very existence of sovereignty in a multipolar world. Furthermore, it is 
noteworthy to point out that Mouffe is concerned especially with popular sovereignty. As 
discussed previously, not all of the states that make up the global order are democracies. As 
Mouffe recognises, a number of the prominent rising powers have authoritarian political 
structures (2013, 28). In these states, the concept of popular sovereignty is expressed in a 
different way than in Western secular democracies. As discussed in section 3.1, Mouffe thinks 
that “rule by the people” can take many different legitimate forms (2013, 30). Popular 
sovereignty is thus not identical to Western democracy. Unfortunately, Mouffe does not make 
entirely clear what counts as “rule by the people”. Therefore, when I refer to “the people” I 
make no assumption on how this political association is internally organised. In the previous 
section, I have discussed that internal sovereignty can take popular or authoritarian forms. 
Either form of internal sovereignty presupposes external sovereignty. Therefore, a global 
centralised order does not negate sovereignty. 
One could object that a people cannot be sovereign once it transfers authority to a 
supranational institution or a global legal order. Indeed, this transfer implies a loss of 
traditional Westphalian sovereignty. An external power is allowed to enter the authority 
structure of the state. The people or government of that state are no longer the sole supreme 
authority on legitimate behaviour. We have already seen that what counts as legitimate 
behaviour between states is based on an intersubjective agreement. This agreement might also 
include rules on what counts as legitimate behaviour within states. This is the case in for 
example the European Union or the SALT treaties on nuclear proliferation. However, it does 
not imply a loss of sovereignty in the constitutive sense. The formation of an order affirms the 
constitutive power of its founders and therefore their sovereignty. The constitutive powers 
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subject themselves to a law that they instituted themselves. This does imply a loss of strict 
Westphalian sovereignty. However, I contend that sovereignty does not mean full 
independence from external actors. Especially in the interconnected world of the 21th century, 
such a view of sovereignty is untenable. Bodin’s conception of sovereignty as top-down 
coercion is not fit for the current historical circumstances. In my view, sovereignty denotes a 
relation between various structures of authority. This relation comprises the mutual 
recognition of the other’s legitimate role as co-author of the common legal order. The various 
degrees of Westphalian sovereignty or independence of the constituents will depend on their 
agreement in the legal order.23 Even if this aspect of sovereignty is partly transferred, the 
constituent aspect of sovereignty is not infringed upon. Moreover, the formation of a global 
order is an expression of that constituent power. The power to create new forms of order 
remains at the level of the constituents.  
This approach gives rise to two related questions: do all peoples have constituent power and 
what about new claims on sovereignty, such as in the case of a secession? To start with the 
latter, claims to sovereignty are not guaranteed to be successful. As in the case with legitimacy, 
the recognition depends on the intersubjective estimation of power or the willingness of the 
established order. As discussed in chapter four, the constitution of the global order is a 
constant interplay between the real, the symbolic and the legal order. Whether the great 
powers will recognise the sovereignty of an other people depends in the first place on their 
intersubjective interpretation of the balance of power. Even if this does not provide sufficient 
grounds for recognition, a people can be regarded as sovereign if the established order wishes 
to do so. This relates to the first question. Not all peoples enjoy constitutive power in the 
international domain. Every political association depends on the recognition by others for their 
right to self-government. Some claims to sovereignty can fail or be subject to discussion.24 Not 
all peoples who wish to be sovereign will actually enjoy that the right to self-government. 
                                                          
23 The EU is a prominent example of this logic. We have seen that the constituents can remain 
sovereign, even though they have subjected themselves to some supranational institutions. The case of 
the Brexit shows that it is even possible to leave (a part of) the legal order. This can be seen as an 
expression of the constituent power of the United Kingdom. However, as the negotiations over the 
new EU-UK relation develops, it becomes clear that regaining sovereignty does not imply regaining 
full independence. The sovereignty of the UK is expressed in its ability to reconstitute the terms of the 
relation with the EU.  
24 We can think of current day examples such as Kosovo or Catalonia to illustrate this phenomenon. 
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Mouffe could object that this proves the point that a global order goes beyond sovereignty. 
However, the non-recognition of claims to sovereignty does not only occur in a centralised 
global order. It is inherent in the concept of sovereignty that I defend.  
Now we can see how a global legal order does not aim to go beyond sovereignty. The existence 
of sovereign states depends on an international legal order in a multipolar world. Such an 
international order consists of the mutual recognition of the sovereignty of its constituents. 
Even though a global order might interfere with the authority structure of its constituents, it 
does not go beyond sovereignty. The constituents remain sovereign, because they are the ones 
that harbour the power to constitute new forms of political association. Sovereignty as “the 
right to self-government” is not damaged. In this way, a centralised global order is not subject 
to objection B.  
7. Conclusion 
In conclusion, I will summarise the main argumentative steps of this thesis and briefly present 
some remarks on its conclusions. I have argued that, in contrast with what Mouffe beliefs 
herself, a centralised global order can be legitimised on the basis of Mouffe’s realist agonistic 
principles. As a start, I enquired what kind of global order would be acceptable for Mouffe, 
given her own ontological commitments. Mouffe makes clear what kind of order is 
unacceptable for her in her critique of cosmopolitanism. She refutes cosmopolitan proposals 
for a centralised global order because they aim to go beyond hegemony and beyond 
sovereignty. I have shown that the core of the disagreement between Mouffe and the 
cosmopolitans lies in the fact that they have different political ontologies. According to 
Mouffe, the cosmopolitans fail to acknowledge the central aspects of the political: power, value 
pluralism and conflict. This leads them to believe that a non-exclusionary, peaceful global 
order based on universal human traits is possible and desirable. Mouffe argues that truly 
grasping the essence of the political shows that a centralised global order is inherently 
exclusionary and therefore prone to evoke violent antagonisms. A cosmopolitan order is not 
able to accommodate value pluralism because it presents itself as universal and does not offer 
tools for contesting its legitimacy. This is captured in the critique that cosmopolitanism aims 
to go beyond hegemony (A). Also, a centralised global order would negate the democratic 
right of self-expression of sovereign peoples. In other words, cosmopolitanism tries to go 
38 
 
beyond sovereignty (B). For these reasons, Mouffe refutes the idea of a centralised global order. 
Instead, she proposes a decentralised multipolar order. According to her, such an order is able 
to accommodate difference and therefore less likely to lead to violent conflicts. I objected that 
this is at odds with her own view on the transformation from antagonistic to agonistic 
relations. To retain stability and contain conflict in a situation of balance of power, the 
international domain needs a shared commitment to certain norms and rules in the form of a 
centralised global order. 
To defend my thesis, I needed to show that such a global order could be founded and 
legitimised on the basis of principles that are acceptable to Mouffe. This means that it has to 
be able to accommodate the political. In other words, it has to build on Mouffe’s political 
ontology and accommodate objection A and B. For the former, I turned to the schools of 
realism in political theory and the study of international relations. These schools share relevant 
aspects of Mouffe’s political ontology. From IR theory I drew the concept of the balance of 
power. A balance of power provides the correct background conditions for the formation of a 
shared symbolic space. The intersubjective estimation of rough equal power lies at the basis of 
a transformation of identities from enemies to competitors. This provides the necessary 
common ground to constitute a global legal order. This shows how a global order can be 
founded on the basis realist agonistic principles. For an account of legitimacy, I referred to the 
school of political realism in political philosophy. They argue that the demands of legitimacy 
are context specific. The legitimation of the authority of the global order does not have to take 
the form of an appeal to universal moral values. What matters is that the legitimation resonates 
with the beliefs of those that it is offered to. In the context of a global balance of power, the 
legal order can be legitimised by an appeal to the symbolic order. This shows how a global 
order can be legitimised in line with realist agonistic principles.  
Lastly, I needed to show that this centralised global order can accommodate objection A and 
B. The centralised global order does not necessarily go beyond hegemony. Hegemony becomes 
problematic when it presents itself as universal. This forecloses the contestation of its 
legitimacy and disqualifies dissidents. The balance of power makes sure that claims to 
universality are met with resistance. The major powers cannot risk to antagonise each other 
by denying them the right to contest the terms of the shared legal order. I also refuted Mouffe’s 
objection that there is no shared identity that binds the global actors together. I argued that a 
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global order does not presuppose a shared global identity. Instead, it is based on the mutual 
recognition that one has to come to terms with the other if one wishes to preserve stability. In 
sum, a centralised global order allows for a legitimate expression of difference and 
contestation of its legitimacy. In response to objection B, I argued that the internal sovereignty 
of a people is dependent on external recognition. Also, sovereignty as constitutive power is 
not negated by the establishment of a global legal framework. The establishment of a global 
order is both an expression and precondition of sovereignty. In this sense, a global centralised 
order does not go beyond sovereignty. 
These argumentative steps warrant the conclusion that a centralised global order can be 
legitimised on the basis of Mouffe’s realist agonistic principles. I need to make a few remarks 
on this conclusion. My argument partly builds on the historical circumstances of multi polarity 
in the international domain. The dynamics of the balance of power play a pivotal role in 
overcoming the universalising tendency of hegemony. My conclusions only obtain under 
these circumstances. It is also important to mention that my argument describes the possibility 
of establishing and legitimising a centralised order based on realist agonistic principles. I do 
not claim that a balance of power necessarily leads to the establishment of a global legal order. 
As I have mentioned, a stable balance of power might fall apart due to the dynamics of the 
security dilemma. I have argued that a balance of power forms the correct background 
condition under which a stable global order can develop. The outset of this thesis is not to 
forecast what will happen, but to criticise Mouffe’s argument that a global centralised order is 
impossible or undesirable. In my view, Mouffe has no fundamental reasons to reject the kind 
of centralised global order I have proposed.  
However, I do not consider it an deficit of my argument that it deals only with specific historic 
circumstances. Rather, it neatly fits the twofold goal of my thesis. On the one hand, it is an 
internal theoretical argument against Mouffe. She argues that under circumstances of multi 
polarity a global order should be decentralised. I have objected that, on the basis of her own 
principles and under that same circumstances, a centralised global order can be legitimised. 
Therefore, it is not problematic that my argument is confined to the historic specific 
circumstances of multi polarity. On the other hand, my argument responds to a practical 
demand for thinking about the possibilities of international cooperation. I started this thesis 
by introducing cosmopolitanism as a theory that is partly motivated by the increased need for 
40 
 
international cooperation to address the common challenges of the 21th century. It has not 
been my goal to defend moral or political cosmopolitanism. My proposal for a centralised 
global order is not the same as Held’s global democracy. Nonetheless, it shares the feature 
with cosmopolitanism that it envisages a single global legal framework that can accommodate 
peaceful relations and enable states to collectively address common challenges. These 
challenges present themselves against the backdrop of a shifting geopolitical landscape. A 
condition of multi polarity is likely to take hold in the course of the 21th century. Therefore, I 
view it as a strength rather than a deficit that my argument investigates the possibility of a 
legitimate and stable global order under circumstances of multi polarity. 
In my thesis, I have touched on the debate between descriptive and prescriptive branches of 
political theory. I aimed to connect the two branches rather than to set them apart as distinct 
fields of enquiry. It is my view that normative questions always emerge in specific 
circumstances. Throughout my argument, I have tried to show how questions on legitimacy 
or sovereignty present themselves in the context of a balance of power in the international 
domain. Nonetheless, I have not failed to notice that both political realists and Mouffe 
sometimes remain unclear about how and which normative conclusions are warranted by 
their political ontology.25 I think it is one of the main challenges for political philosophy to 
enquire how to approach normative questions under the fast changing circumstances. In my 
view, this enquiry should include meta theoretical questions on the nature of the relation 
between descriptive and normative theory as well as consider how globalisation affects the 
context under which normative questions emerge.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 See supra note 8, 11 and 12.  
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